The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence of Money and Prestige in Human Research by Wilson, Robin Fretwell
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Scholarly Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2010 
The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence of 
Money and Prestige in Human Research 
Robin Fretwell Wilson 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, wilsonrf@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence of Money and 
Prestige in Human Research, 36 Am. J. L. & Med. 295 (2010). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington & Lee University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized 
administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
Citation: 36 Am. J.L. & Med. 295 2010 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Thu Aug 23 15:46:19 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0098-8588
American Journal ofLaw e0 Medicine, 36 (2010): 295-325
@ 2010 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics
Boston University School of Law
The Death of Jesse Gelsinger:
New Evidence of the Influence of
Money and Prestige in Human
Research
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilsont
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, Jesse Gelsinger died while participating in a human gene-
therapy trial at the University of Pennsylvania ("Penn"). His death came to
signify the corrosive influence of financial interests in human subjects
research.! After Jesse's death, the media reported that one researcher, Dr.
t Class of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. This Essay draws on Robin Fretwell Wilson, Estate of Gelsinger v. Trustees of University
of Pennsylvania: Money, Prestige, and Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research, in
HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 229 (Sandra H. Johnson, Joan H.
Krause, Richard S. Saver, & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2009). I am grateful for feedback I
have received during presentations at The University of Illinois College of Law, Wake Forest
University School of Medicine, Drexel University School of Law, Saint Louis University Center
for Health Law Studies' Distinguished Speakers Series, Carilion Medical Center, the 35th
Annual Conference of the Public Responsibility in Medicine and Research (PRIM&R), and at
Boston University's symposium "Follow the Money: The Impact of Economic on the Delivery
of Health Care." I am indebted to Bob Brummel, Charles Hite, former Assistant U.S. Attorney
David Hoffman, David Hyman, Fran Miller, Alan Milstein, and especially to Paul Gelsinger for
their insight and assistance with this Essay. This is for Fran Miller, who has always inspired
me.
I See, e.g., Patricia C. Kuszler, Biotechnology Entrepreneurship and Ethics: Principles,
Paradigms, and Products, 25 MED. & L. 491, 495 (2006) ("[L]apses in human subjects
protection remains an ever-present hazard. This has been exemplified by a series of high
profile research ethics scandals in the U.S.-the Jesse Gelsinger case in which a research
subject in a gene-therapy experiment died and it was alleged that the researchers' financial
interest in the vector influenced them to prematurely engage in the clinical trial that resulted
in Mr. Gelsinger's death."); Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring Scientific
Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 641, 645 (2004)
("[F]inancial interests may negatively impact researchers' dealings with research subjects
during a trial. When huge profits lure, and pressure mounts to bring novel drugs or therapies
quickly to the market, potential risks may be perceived somewhat more lightly, and inclusion
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James Wilson, held shares in a biotech company, Genovo, which stood to gain
from the research's outcome-shares that The Wall Street Journal later valued
at $13.5 million, although Wilson maintains he did not make nearly this
much.' At the time Penn authorized Wilson's deal, internal Penn documents
implicitly valued Wilson's stake in Genovo at approximately $28.5 to $33
million.3
Jesse's death sparked two separate lawsuits: one by the family, who sued
in tort, and one by the federal government, which framed alleged errors in the
research trial as a civil False Claims Act violation. Both suits settled, with no
public apologies or acknowledgement of wrongdoing in either case.' The
government refused to make public the documents it collected, despite
requests from the family.' Thus, in what is arguably the most famous conflict-
of-interest case in medicine, we have known for a decade almost nothing
about the nature of the financial stakes that Wilson, and Penn, had in the
research's outcome, or why Penn authorized a researcher to hold such a
substantial stake in that research's outcome. How this web of financial ties
came to enmesh Jesse's trial is a subject worthy of exploration because it
provides an important lens for evaluating two divergent visions about the role
of money in research.
In 2009, the prestigious Institute of Medicine ("IOM") joined a growing
chorus of voices that called for significant reforms to the rules governing
disclosure of financial conflicts of interest. The IOM and other groups would
presumptively bar nearly all equity stakes by researchers like Wilson.
Although the IOM's view represents the dominant narrative about financial
conflicts of interest, it is not the only one. One influential group urges that
financial conflicts can never be removed from medical research and, indeed,
should not be.'
This Essay evaluates these polar positions by examining Jesse's
participation in human research and his death. Drawing on new evidence
from the documents collected in the Gelsingers' lawsuit,' this Essay asks
specifically whether new and better restrictions on financial conflicts of
interest would have made a difference in Jesse's case and concludes that more
robust restrictions would not have mattered. This Essay argues that rather
or exclusion criteria may become more flexible. This seems to have happened in the well-
known case of Jesse Gelsinger.").
2 Scott Hensley, Targeted Genetics' Genovo Deal Leads to Windfall for Researcher, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 10, 2000, at 112; Telephone Interview with Michael Waitzkin, Attorney for James
Wilson, Inst. for Human Gene Therapy, Univ. of Pa. Health Sys. (Mar. 31, 2008).
' Memorandum from Kathleen A. Denis, Dir., Ctr. for Tech. Transfer, to Neil Nathanson,
Chair, Conflict of Interest Standing Comm., at 1, 3 (Dec. 15, 1994) (quantifying shares to be
held by Wilson and reporting the financial terms on which Genovo shares were purchased by a
minority shareholder, Biogen) (on file with author).
4 E-mail from Paul Gelsinger to Robin Fretwell Wilson (Mar. 14, 2008) (on file with
author).
'See David B. Caruso, Feds Settle Suit Over Death in Penn Gene Therapy Study, AP ALERT
- PA., Feb. 9, 2005.
'See infra Part VI.
7I received the documents presented here from Paul Gelsinger and the Gelsingers'
attorney, Alan Milstein, who obtained them during the course of their litigation from a
whistleblower inside Penn. While the amount of the Gelsingers' settlement was sealed at the
time of settlement, the documents were not. The researchers declined requests to be
interviewed by me, although Wilson provided information through his attorney.
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than attempting to expunge financial interests from research, those interests
should trigger significant, ongoing review of the affected clinical trials, much
like the post-approval monitoring now used randomly by leading research
institutions. Indeed, had Wilson's outsized financial stake triggered
mandatory monitoring, people inside Penn likely would have stumbled upon
the string of questionable decisions in Jesse's trial, including departures from
the research protocol, long before those mistakes cascaded, culminating in
Jesse's death.
Part II describes the research trial Jesse participated in and the lawsuits
spawned by his death. In particular, Part II recaps the cavalcade of errors
that the FDA says plagued the trial long before and up to Jesse's death, errors
now largely acknowledged by Wilson. Part III reviews what the researchers
told Jesse about the trial's risks, the results of prior animal studies, and the
basic protections he would receive as a participant, and contrasts those
disclosures with the frank disclosures approved by regulators at the trial's
start. The approved disclosures candidly and explicitly revealed the death of
animals in prior trials, vital information that was never shared with Jesse.
Like the researchers' sterile description of those animal trials, Wilson's and
Penn's financial interests in Jesse's trial were disclosed in a single bland
sentence.'
Part IV then follows the money, showing the nature and extent of Wilson's
financial conflict of interest. This Part poignantly demonstrates that a lot of
good people inside Penn sounded alarm bells about Wilson's hefty stake, to no
avail. Although Penn's administration understood that Wilson's conflict of
interest could be bypassed, it chose not to. Part IV also sketches the
precautions suggested by Penn faculty to reduce risks to subjects participating
in Wilson's research, such as creating a firewall between Wilson and crucial
decisions in Jesse's trial. Part V then contrasts those proposed precautions
with what actually transpired in Jesse's trial, noting the integral role Wilson
played in many key decisions.
Part VI then evaluates the competing narratives about financial conflicts
of interest through the lens of Jesse's trial. This Part ultimately concludes
that even if Wilson had no financial interest in the trial's outcome, his desire
for "recognition by [his] colleagues" and "successful competition for grants
and the awarding of academic promotions and tenure" in the "competitive
profession" of "academic medicine" likely would have driven him to make the
same choices.9 Hence, deaths like Jesse's are unlikely to be avoided simply by
banning financial conflicts. Instead, financial ties like Wilson's should trigger
greater oversight of human trials and monitoring for human safety, an idea
explored in Part VII.
8 See Hosp. of the U. of Pa. & The Children's Hosp. of Phila., Consent Agreement for
Recombinant Adenovirus Gene Transfer in Adults with Partial Ornithine Transcarbarnylase
Deficiency, at 11 (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Consent Form].
9 James M. Wilson, Lessons Learned from the Gene Therapy Trial for Orithine
Transcarbamylase Deficiency, 96 MOLECULAR GENETICS & METABOLISM 151, 155 (2009)
[hereinafter Lessons Learned].
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II. JESSE'S ILL-FATED PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RESEARCH
Jesse was three months past his 18th birthday when he died 10 years ago
on September 17, 1999.1o This Part explains the impetus behind the human
research trial in which Jesse participated, the structure of Jesse's trial, and the
principal figures conducting it. It then describes the pair of lawsuits that
resulted, the novelty of the claims advanced, and how the settlement of both
suits operated to shield from public view mistakes made in Jesse's research
trial.
A. JESSE'S RESEARCH TRIAL
Jesse had a rare disease, a liver deficiency called ornithine
transcarbamylase deficiency ("OTCD") that made it difficult for his liver to
process proteins. If he ingested too much protein, the resulting nitrogen
would overwhelm his system, fail to be processed as urea, and turn to
ammonia, a poison to the central nervous system and the body."
Jesse managed his OTCD with a special diet developed by the leading
OTCD researcher, Dr. Mark Batshaw-a co-Principal Investigator for Jesse's
study. Batshaw, in fact, developed a medication that pulled Jesse out of a
coma the December before Jesse enrolled in the trial. The coma was brought
on when Jesse went off his diet.12 Aside from these periodic episodes after
taking in too much protein, Jesse was a relatively healthy functioning adult-
he had just graduated from high school, had a job, and was paying his parents
rent.' Jesse had just bought a motorcycle.14
The idea behind the gene-therapy trial was to use a cousin of the common
cold virus, an adenovirus or vector developed by Wilson, as a sort of "taxi" to
deliver corrective genes to Jesse's liver in hopes that they would express-
relieving Jesse of the hold OTCD had on his life.' The third player in Jesse's
research trial was the clinician who would oversee the injection of the vector
into Jesse's body, Dr. Steve Raper, a surgeon at Penn and Batshaw's co-
Principal Investigator. 16 Wilson wore a second hat in the research trial. He
was also a sponsor of the trial, meaning that an entity with which Wilson had
'o Rick Weiss, Boy's Cancer Prompts FDA to Halt Gene Therapy, WASH. POST, Mar. 4,
2005, at A02.
" Consent Form, supra note 8, at 2.
12 Paul Gelsinger, Statement at the Forum on Research Ethics, University of South
Carolina School of Law (Apr. 5, 2001) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Gelsinger
Remarks].
IS Id. at 4.4 Id.
1" Letter from Mark L. Batshaw, Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., Steven E. Raper, Assoc. Prof.,
Dep't of Surgery, Univ. of Pa. & James M. Wilson, Inst. for Human Gene Therapy, Univ. of Pa.
Health Sys. (Sept. 23, 1999) (to be read at Jesse Gelsinger's funeral) (on file with author).
" See, e.g., Alexis Gilbert, Penn Hit by Gene Therapy Lawsuit: Suit Calls Penn Negligent in
Study that Led to Arizona Teen's Death Last Year, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Sept. 19, 2000, at
News Section, available at
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2000/09/19/New
s/Penn-Hit.By.Gene.Therapy.Lawsuit-2161264.shtml (last visited Aug. 6, 2008).
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financial ties, Genovo, had the right to license any technologies developed in
Wilson's research.
Jesse participated in a Phase I clinical trial designed to test the safety of
an intervention, not its efficacy, which usually gets tested in later phases.
Jesse participated in a stair-step dosage trial designed to include 20 subjects
in total. Jesse was participant OTC.019.i9
Stair-Step Trial
6
100 Fold less than
5 animals received
Jesse is patient OTC.019, 2nd
patient in this cohort. Monkeys
received dosage of 1 generation
virus that is 17 fold greater than
5.000 Fold less than the dosage of the 3rd generation
animals received virus Jesse received.
Figure 1
As Figure 1 shows, subjects on the lowest stair-step would receive 5,000 fold
less of the vector used in prior animal trials in which monkeys and mice
died. 20 Those animals received a first generation virus, in contrast to the third
generation virus that Jesse and other participants received.2 1 Unlike the first
generation virus, the third generation virus lacked the portions that cause it to
replicate in the body and to make people sick-that is, the parts that cause
viral replication and viral pathogenesis.22
The protocol for the trial provided that participants on the highest stair-
step, as Jesse was, were to get 100 fold less of the vector than the animals
received.23  After Jesse's death, the Institute for Human Gene Therapy
("IHGT"), which Wilson directed at Penn, disclosed in documents filed with
17 Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, Hasty Decisions in the Race to a Cure?; Gene Therapy
Study Proceeded Despite Safety, Ethics Concerns, WASH. PosT, Nov. 21, 1999, at AOL. See also
infra Part IV.
" See generally The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucml43534.htm (last visited Apr. 22,
2010).
'9 Wilson, supra note 9, at 152.
20 Mark L. Batshaw et al., Recombinant Adenovirus Gene Transfer in Adults with Partial
Ornithine Transcarbamylase Deficiency (OTCD), 10 HUMAN GENE THERAPY 2419, 2429
(1999).
21 Wilson, supra note 9, at 152.
22 Consent Form, supra note 8, at 3.
2 Batshaw et al., supra note 20, at 2429.
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the FDA that Jesse received a considerably higher dose - 17 fold less of the
vector than what the animals that died in a prior trial received.24
Jesse's ill-fated participation in the clinical trial began with a June 1999
visit by Jesse and his father, Paul Gelsinger, to Penn to see if Jesse was eligible
to participate in the trial.25 During that visit, Steve Raper went through the
Consent Form with Jesse and Paul.26 Jesse clearly understood that the trial, if
successful, would provide no lasting benefit to him, but that it might pave the
way to correcting the disease in newborn children. Paul Gelsinger explains
that Jesse "signed on to help everybody and, hopefully, himself in the long
run."27 As Part III shows, neither Jesse nor Paul received the unvarnished
truth about the results of prior animal studies, nor did they realize the
magnitude of Wilson's potential gains from the research trial.
On September 13, 1999, Jesse was infused with the vector despite the fact
that his ammonia levels fell outside the protocol's safety limit.28 Over the next
four days, the vector took over Jesse's entire body, shutting down his vital
organs. He died on September 17, 1999.
In the months following Jesse's death, the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives held hearings about his death, as did a host of federal
regulators.2 9 The Washington Post also uncovered "[t]he first evidence that
,,30Wilson's company did in fact have a financial interest in the experiment,
raising questions about Wilson's motives. Ultimately, the FDA charged the
researchers with protocol violations, misleading disclosures, and other
mistakes in the trial. As the next Part explains, despite two separate lawsuits,
" UNIV. OF PENN. ALMANAC BETWEEN ISSUES, INST. FOR HUMAN GENE THERAPY
RESPONDS TO FDA (Feb. 14, 2000),
http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/between/FDAresponse.html; see also Wilson, supra note 9,
at 152.
25 Gelsinger Remarks, supra note 12, at 3.
26 Id.
27 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Estate of Gelsinger v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania:
Money, Prestige, and Conflicts ofInterest in Human Subjects Research, in HEALTH LAW AND
BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 229, 236 (Sandra H. Johnson et al. eds., 2009).
" See Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 154.
29Id. at 153.
"0 Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, How We Uncovered The Hidden Fatality In A Clinical
Trial, 49 SCIENCE WRITERS 1, 2 (2000). The Washington Post reporters who broke the story
say Wilson was not forthcoming about the size of his financial stake. When first asked, "[iln
two separate conversations . . . [Wilson] told [Washington Post reporter Rick Weiss] that his
company had no interest in the OTC experiment." Id.
After more digging, the reporters found:
SEC documents and online press releases showing the company had attracted tens of
millions of dollars from companies interested in developing ways to deliver genes to the liver
and lungs - and Wilson himself had said he considered OTC the perfect disease for testing a
liver delivery system that could be used for an array of diseases.
Rick called Wilson and had a heart-to-heart talk with him in which he candidly expressed
his distress that Wilson had been less than forthcoming about the Genovo interests. It was a
difficult conversation since Rick had covered Wilson's work over a number of years and both
knew each other pretty well. Rick told Wilson he wasn't sure he'd be able to trust him any
more. Wilson responded that he also felt bad but that he thought it must have been a
miscommunication.
Id.
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many of the questions raised by the FDA and others remained unanswered for
nearly a decade.
B. A CASE OF FIRSTS
Jesse's death was a case of firsts. Jesse was the first person to die in a
human gene-therapy trial.3 ' His family's lawsuit was also the first high-profile
suit in which a family of a participant sued in tort to recover under a variety of
new and creative claims.3 2 That suit was also the first to name a bioethicist,
the world famous Arthur Caplan, director of Penn's Center for Bioethics, as a
defendant based on the advice he gave the researchers regarding study
design-which essentially urged testing the protocol on relatively healthy
adults rather than dying infants. 3 The family's lawsuit was also the first to
spotlight a financial conflict of interest by a researcher, Wilson.3 4
Jesse's trial was also the first to trigger a lawsuit by the government in
which it framed errors in a human subjects research trial as a civil False
Claims Act violation, bringing to bear the crushing power of the penalties
under that act.35 And Jesse's trial was the first to bounce researchers from
human research for a period of years, albeit by agreement, and then to subject
one of them, Wilson, to monitoring for a decade. As part of that settlement,
Wilson was required to write an article about Lessons Learned from Jesse's
trial as a condition precedent to being readmitted to human subjects research
without restriction, another first.3 6  In 2009, almost a decade after Jesse's
death, Wilson published his long awaited Lessons Learned article.
For a case of firsts, one would think the public would have access to a
storehouse of information about the underlying financial conflict of interest
and the mistakes made in Jesse's trial, if any. Yet no public record exists of
either proceeding because both settled. 8 The family's lawsuit settled for an
undisclosed amount less than 7 weeks after filing, before Penn even
3 Jim Smith, Hospitals, Docs Settle with Feds in Gene-Therapy Death, PHILA. DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 10, 2005, at 24. See infra pg. 11 and footnote 10 (describing deaths in Paris gene-
therapy trials).
3 Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40, 41 (2003).
'3 See Arthur Allen, Bioethics Comes of Age, SALON, Sept. 28, 2000,
http://www.salon.com/health/feature/2000/09/28/caplan/index.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2008). Caplan's advice represented the traditional wisdom at the time. See Wilson, supra
note 27, at 235. Ethicists now question whether healthy subjects should ever be subjected to
more than minimal risks. See, e.g., Nancy M.P. King & Odile Cohen-Haguenauer, En Route to
Ethical Recommendations for Gene Transfer Clinical Trials, 16 MOLECULAR THERAPY 432,
436 (2008).
' See Wilson, supra note 26, at 248; Allen, supra note 33.
31 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District, Pennsylvania, U.S. Settles
Case of Gene Therapy Study That Ended with Teen's Death (Feb. 9, 2005) (on file with
author).
36 Id.
"Lessons Learned, supra note 9.
3 See Caruso, supra note 5.
301
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answered.3 9 The government's suit settled before a civil charging document
was even filed, burying for nearly a decade crucial details of that case.
Jesse's death is worth re-examining, not only as a gripping piece of
medical history, but also because other gene-therapy trial participants have
also died.o Moreover, because the rules governing conflicts of interest and
disclosure of risks have largely remained unchanged since Jesse's death,
understanding what went wrong in Jesse's trial can help us to improve the
oversight of human subjects research. As the next Part documents, Jesse and
Paul were told only partial truths about the risks Jesse would be taking by
participating in the trial.
III. "DISCLOSURES" OF RISK AND BENEFIT
The disclosure form that Jesse actually saw and signed left a lot to be
desired in terms of securing informed consent. The Consent Form alerts
participants repeatedly that the trial is a non-therapeutic safety trial-that is,
participants should not expect to gain anything from it.4' Jesse clearly
understood he could not gain anything from participating in the trial. In fact,
Paul often says he was a hero for participating precisely because he could not
gain anything from it.4 2
The Consent Form also discusses the risks of the trial, and lists three
major risks to consider: "that receiving the virus now may prevent you from
receiving a therapeutic dose of the virus in the future," and that the virus may
cause "an inflammation of your liver [or,] an immune response from your
body which could damage the liver." 43 In fact, the latter is what killed Jesse: a
massive immune system response. 4 After Jesse's death, Batshaw said it was
like Jesse had fallen off of a cliff.45
' Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Penn Settles Gene Therapy Suit; University Pays
Undisclosed Sum to Family of Teen Who Died, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2000, at A04.
' At least one other death has resulted in a gene-therapy trial. In 1998, researchers in
Paris began gene-therapy trials on 11 children suffering from X-linked Severe Combined
Immunodeficiency (X-SCID) or the "bubble boy" disease, a rare immune system disorder
caused by a single gene defect. Four of the 11 children developed T-cell leukemia, one of whom
died in October 2004. Weiss, supra note 10. "There is no doubt, in the Paris cases," the BBC
reported, "that the leukemia was caused by the gene therapy, where the introduced gene was
implanted next to, and switched on, an oncogene (a cancer causing gene)." QUJA: Gene
Therapy Cancer Case, BBC NEWS, Dec. 18, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7149460.stm.
41 Consent Form, supra note 8, at 3.
42 Gelsinger Remarks, supra note 12. Nonetheless, sprinkled throughout the Consent
Form are references to evidence that "gene therapy for [OTCD] may be helpful." Consent
Form, supra note 8, at 3. The mixed messages about the therapeutic value of participating are
problematic because they could mislead participants. See Nancy King, Defining and
Describing BenefitAppropriately in Clinical Trials, 28 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 332 (2000).
* Consent Form, supra note 8, at 7.
* Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech Death ofJesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 28,
1999, at 137 (quoting Steven E. Raper).
' Paul Smaglik, After Gene Therapy Death: Investigators Ponder What Went Wrong, 13
THE SCIENTIST 1, 1 (1999).
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The risk discussion includes one of the three references in the 11 page
Consent Form to the possibility of death. As Figure 2 shows, it notes that liver
inflammation could be "life-threatening."
Although we believe the virus is safe, it is possible that it could cause an Milammation of
the liver <t hpatitis. It is even possible that this inflammation could lead to liver toxicity or
failure and be life-threatening.
Figure 246
Elsewhere, as Figure 3 indicates, the Consent Form quantifies the risk of
death from a biopsy, which may be needed during the course of the trial:
Tnere is also a very small risk ( in 10,000) of serious
unpredicted complications which can include death.
Figure 347
Even though a remote risk, this statistic caused a heart-stopping moment
for Jesse and Paul. Paul later recalled telling "Jesse that he needed to read
and understand what he was getting into, that this was serious stuff." 8
After Jesse's death, The Washington Post and other news outlets widely
reported that a predecessor of this form disclosed the deaths of animals in an
earlier trial.4 9 Figure 4 shows what Jesse was told about those prior animal
studies in the Consent Form.
The animals have notshiown toxic effectsto the liver or other body organs at the dosage
of virus that is needed to transoort the sene in this study. We hav e also tested the safety of this
virus in monkeys and have not found toxicity at the doses-being used in this study. (Higher.
doses were.associated with liver inflmmation [hepatitis] in animals.)
The
maximum dose of virus we are proposing to use is still below that which bas caused any severe
problems in mice or monkeys.
Figure 450
In both discussions, the Consent Form sidesteps whether animals died in
prior trials, electing instead to emphasize the lack of toxic effect at "the doses
being used in this study." In good lawyerly fashion, neither lies about the
deaths of the monkeys and mice-each just skirts the plain facts.
Two versions of the famed "monkey death" form were tucked in with the
documents provided by a Penn whistleblower to the Gelsingers' attorney. As
Figure 5 shows, the Institutional Review Board ("IRB"), which oversees
research at Penn, approved the research on October 6, 1995, and cautioned
the researchers that nothing could be changed in the disclosure form without
4 Consent Form, supra note 8, at 7.
47 Id. at 8.
48 PAUL GELSINGER, JESSE'S INTENT 5 (2001), available at
http://www.circare.org/submit/jintent.pdf (last visited April 26, 2010).
" Nelson & Weiss, supra note 17; Nelson & Weiss, supra note 30, at 2 ("The original
consent form reviewed by the RAC disclosed that monkeys died after receiving a high dose of a
similar genetically-altered virus carrying the OTC gene. Yet the monkey deaths had
disappeared from the consent form that Jesse received, which we got from Penn after
obtaining Jesse's father's permission.").
o Consent Form, supra note 8, at 3, 7.
303
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permission.
Amendments: if you wish to change any aspoct of this study,
such as procedures, the consent forms, or the investigators,- please
communicate your requested changes in writing to the Associate Director
for Regulatory Affairs. The new procedures cannot be initiated until
Committtee approval has been given.
Figure 5"
Figure 6 presents excerpts from a disclosure form dated 10/2/95 by "ser,"
presumably co-principal investigator Steve Raper, making it very likely that
this is the form the IRB saw and approved. The 10/2/95 disclosure form
bluntly referenced the death of both monkeys and mice, as Figure 6 shows. 52
In mice and monkyatia doses
of the virus have been, associated- With eience, of fiver i'lmmto (hp10te
Figure 6"
Figure 6 makes clear that the researchers were capable of saying that
animals died in earlier studies and that participants could die too. But the
Consent Form Jesse received dropped these bald statements in favor of the
claim that animals did not show toxic effects at the dosage "used in this
study."54
In contrast to the Consent Form's scant attention to animal deaths in
earlier trials, the Consent Form Jesse signed devotes ample attention to all the
things that will reduce the risks to Jesse, whatever those risks are. The
Consent Form explains that the trial is a stair-step trial, with escalating
doses." It assures the reader that if something arises, "we should be able to
identify any problems early and start treatment." It also promises to disclose
56
the effects experienced by prior participants. Crucially, it says "[i]f there are
serious side effects the study will be stopped."5 7 And as Figure 7 shows, the
"' Memorandum from Ruth Clark, Assoc. Dir. of Reg. Affairs, Committee on Studies
Involving Human Beings, Office of Research Admin. to Mark L. Batshaw, Children's Nat'l
Med. Ctr. (Oct. 6, 1995) (IRB approval letter) (on file with author).
" On November 21, 1995, the researchers responded to comments by members of the
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee ("RAC"), which together with the FDA exercised
oversight authority at the federal level. Memorandum from Mark Batshaw, Steven Raper, &
James Wilson, Univ. of Pennsylvania Health Sys., to Nelson Wivel (Nov. 21, 1995) (on file with
author). In one part of that correspondence, the researchers suggest new text for the Consent
Form in response to the RAC comments. Id. Crucially, the disclosure of monkey and mice
deaths is identical to the disclosure on the 10/02/95 form. Consent Agreement for
Recombinant Adenovirus Gene Transfer in Adults with Partial Ornithine Transcarbarnyalase
Deficiency at 7 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter "1995 Consent Form"].
"' 1995 Consent Form, supra note 52, at 4.
1 Consent Form, supra note 8, at 3. The IRB that exercised regulatory oversight for
Jesse's trial seems to have done everything right-they policed the disclosure, they told the
researchers not to change it without permission-but then the IRB trusted that the researchers
would respect the rules. The mandatory post-approval monitoring suggested in Part VI
presumably would have uncovered this important change in the approved disclosure to
participants.
" See id. at 4-6.
56 Id. at 7.
57Id.
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researchers promised to make all these disclosures in writing to participants
so they can reconsider participating as new information comes up-something
58that Paul Gelsinger says did not happen.
SIGNIFICANT NEW FINDINGS
Any significant new findings developed during the course of the study that could affect
your willingness to continue participating in the study will be provided, in writing, to you.
You will be given a chance to ask questions about this new information before
continuing in the study. In such circumstances, we would revise the informed consent
document and offer you an opportunity to reconsider your participation.
Figure 7 '
Finally, Wilson's ties to the research, as well as Penn's, get disclosed in a
single bland sentence, reproduced in Figure 8.
SPONSOR INFORMATION
Please be aware that the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. James M. Wilson (the Director
of the Institute for Human Gene Therapy), and Genovo, Inc., (a gene therapy company
in which Dr. Wilson holds an interest) have a financial interest in a successful outcome
from the research involved in this study.
Figure 860
The U.S. Government's civil suit for false claims rested in part on the
failure to obey the protocol's adverse event stopping rules and to give notice,
as promised in the Consent Form.6 1 Because both the government's suit and
family's suit both settled, the FDA's charges of mistakes went largely
unanswered by the researchers for nearly a decade. That changed in 2009
with Wilson's publication of his Lessons Learned article, a condition precedent
to being readmitted to human subjects research without restriction. 62
Thus, the FDA charged that the three researchers blew through clinical
stop signs under the protocol, pointing to Grade 3 toxicities on stair-steps
below Jesse. This, the FDA charged, should have stopped the trial but did
not.63 Wilson concedes in his Lessons Learned article that there is substance
" Gelsinger Remarks, supra note 12.
9 Consent Form, supra note 8, at 10-11.
60 Id. at 11.
6 See Press Release, supra note 35; Letter from Steven A. Masiello, Dir., Office of
Compliance & Biologics Quality, FDA. Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research to Mark L.
Batshaw, Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr. 7 (Nov. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2000/ucml59922.htm
(warning letter); see also Letter from Dennis E. Baker, Assoc. Comm'r for Regulatory Affairs,
FDA. Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research to James M. Wilson, Inst. for Human Gene
Therapy, Univ. of Pa. Health Sys. (Feb. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/FOI/ElectronicReadingRoom/ucml44564.htm
(notice of opportunity for hearing).
62 Interview with David Hoffman, Former Assistant U.S. Attorney, in Phila., Pa. (June 6,
2008).
61 See Letter from Steven A. Masiello, Dir., FDA Office of Compliance & Biologics Quality,
Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research to James M. Wilson, Inst. for Human Gene Therapy,
Univ. of Pa. Health Sys. 3 (Nov. 30, 2000), available at www.fda.gov/foi/nidpoe/nl21.pdf
(follow Wilson, James M., M.D., Ph.D. (PDF-1.37 MB) hyperlink) (notice of initial
disqualification proceeding and opportunity to explain).
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to this charge. As he explains, "[t]he clinical trial progressed through the first
five cohorts, although toxicity was indeed observed," which included "fever
and flu-like symptoms with some transient laboratory abnormalities."64
The FDA also alleged that on the day Jesse was infused, his ammonia
65
levels tested outside the limits established by the protocol. As Wilson now
acknowledges, while Jesse's serum ammonia levels on the day of the infusion
"fluctuated around the threshold of 70 pM" - fluctuation the researchers did
not find clinically significant - the protocol "was not written to include clinical
relevance of metabolic measures in assessing inclusion criteria, providing
credence to the FDA's concerns." 66
Compounding these errors, the FDA charged that changes were made to
the protocol and Consent Form without permission from the relevant
oversight bodies at Penn and in the federal government.67  In his Lessons
Learned, Wilson describes the protocol as a "living document with changes
occurring in real time."68  He accedes that in one set of revisions, the
researchers increased the threshold for subjects' serum ammonia from 50 to
70 [tM. Wilson does not directly acknowledge changes to the disclosure about
animal deaths in the Consent Form but, as Part V explains, Wilson says that
all three researchers had a hand in deciding precisely what participants would
be told.
The loose management of Jesse's trial leads most people to wonder why it
occurred, and more particularly whether Wilson's giant-sized financial stake
played any role. Before delving into those questions, the next Part charts how
it came to pass that Wilson had such a substantial stake in the outcome of
Jesse's trial.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE MONEY
The federal conflict of interest and disclosure rules have not changed
materially in the decade since Jesse's death. These rules require researchers
to disclose significant financial relationships-defined as $10,000 in equity,
salary or any other thing of value or 5 percent or more of the shares in an
The Washington Post first reported these adverse events after multiple interviews with
Wilson and others. In their final fact-checking, which included reading Wilson's previous
statements back to him before the story was published, the reporters reveal that,
[w]hen [Deborah Nelson] reached a section that parroted his earlier
representation to us that none of the volunteers preceding Jesse had suffered any
serious side effects, he nervously cleared his throat. Maybe, he said, you'd better
say there were no life-threatening adverse events.
Nelson & Weiss, supra note 30, at 3.
6 'Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 152.
6 Letter from Masiello to Wilson (Nov. 30, 2000), supra note 63, at 5; Lessons Learned,
supra note 9, at 154.
" Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 154.
67 Letter from Dennis E. Baker to Wilson, supra note 61.
6s Id.
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entity-to the institution receiving the grant.69 That institution, Penn, must
eliminate or manage the conflict by the time grant funds are distributed.
The financial arrangement between Wilson, Penn, Genovo, and Genovo's
minority owner but super-majority shareholder, Biogen, was a complex one,
as Figure 9 illustrates.
THE FINANCIAL DEAL
Figure 970
Essentially, Wilson directed a huge institute established at and wholly
owned by Penn, the Institute for Human Gene Therapy, that in its heyday
69 Federal regulations define a "Significant Financial Interest" as "anything of monetary
value, including but not limited to, salary or other payments for services (e.g., consulting fees
or honoraria); equity interests (e.g., stocks, stock options or other ownership interests); and
intellectual property rights (e.g., patents, copyrights and royalties from such rights)." 42
C.F.R. § 50.603 (2008). The definition excludes:
(5) An equity interest that when aggregated for the Investigator and the Investigator's
spouse and dependent children, meets both of the following tests: Does not exceed $10,000 in
value as determined through reference to public prices or other reasonable measures of fair
market value, and does not represent more than a five percent ownership interest in any single
entity; or
(6) Salary, royalties or other payments that when aggregated for the Investigator and the
Investigator's spouse and dependent children over the next twelve months, are not expected to
exceed $10,000.
Id.
70 Wilson, supra note 27, at 244 (adapted with permission from Aspen Publishers).
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claimed over 200 affiliated faculty. IHGT housed intellectual property
developed by Wilson while at Penn and at the University of Michigan, where
he was prior to joining the faculty at Penn. Penn entered into a sponsored
research agreement ("SRA") with Genovo, the biotechnology company that
Wilson established while at Michigan, pursuant to which Penn would grant to
Genovo the rights to license the existing Wilson technologies, together with
the option to license new technology.71 Wilson held varying amounts of stock
in Genovo, depending on who was in and out of Genovo at a given time.
The question presented to Penn's conflict of interest committee was
whether to allow Wilson such a big share in exchange for Genovo and the
entity controlling it, Biogen, doing sponsored research at Penn. Under the
SRA, Genovo would commit $21 million over 5 years to fund research in "Dr.
Wilson's laboratory" and give Penn 5% of the equity in Genovo. 72  In
exchange, Genovo would receive the right to license existing and new Wilson
technologies.73  Wilson would not manage or otherwise control decisions
made by Genovo.74
Although Wilson's stakes in Genovo would be valued at $13.5 million by
The Wall Street Journal on the date that Genovo was acquired by another
company, Penn contemplated that Wilson's shares may have been even more
valuable. 75 The memo excerpted in Figure 10 from Kathleen Denis, Director
of the Center for Technology Transfer at Penn, to the chair of the conflict of
interest committee implicitly priced Wilson's stake in the tens of millions of
dollars. The memo noted that earlier in the same year Biogen purchased its
38% share of Genovo at a cost of $36.2 million over five years, yielding a value
of roughly $952,361 for each 1%.76 Denis notes that Wilson will have a "large
personal stake, approximately 30-35%" of Genovo.77 If sold on the same
terms as Biogen's purchase, this would mean a deal for Wilson in the
neighborhood of $28.5 to $33.3 million.78
71See Memorandum from Denis, supra note 3.
7 See Conflict of Interest Standing Committee Report on Genovo Case, Final Draft, from
Neal Nathanson, Chair, CISC, to Barry Cooperman, Vice Provost for Research (Apr. 5, 1995)
(on file with author) ("This SRA will be used only to fund work in Dr. Wilson's laboratory and
not in the laboratories of other members of his department (Department of Molecular and
Cellular Engineering) or the laboratories of members of the Institute for Human Gene
Therapy."); Memorandum from Denis, supra note 3.
71 Nelson & Weiss, supra note 17.
7 See Letter from Barry S. Cooperman, Vice Provost, Research, to James Wilson (June 29,
1995) (on file with author).
7' See Hensley, supra note 2.
7 ' See Memorandum from Denis, supra note 3.
7 Id.
78 1d.
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INTRAMURAL CORRESPONDENCE
TO: Neil Nathanson, M.D.
Chair, Conflict of Interest Standing Committee
FROM: Kathleen A. Denis, Ph.D.
Director, Center for Technology Transfer
DATE: 15 December 1994
RE: Conflict of Interest, James M. Wilson, M.D., Ph.D.
The most recent Biogen/Genovo term sheet shared with Penn shows Biogen
investing $36.2 million over the next five years in exchange for 38% of Genovo's equity and
commercialization rights.
Dr. Wilson will have a large personal share (approximately 30-35%) although
approximately one-half of this stock has been placed in a trust for his children
Figure 1079
Whether to authorize a stake of this magnitude and what it would mean
for human safety were the questions presented to Penn's Conflict of Interest
Standing Committee ("CISC"), the body charged with overseeing financial
conflicts at Penn.80  The CISC had numerous members. Its membership
included Arthur Caplan, who later advised the researchers on study design.
Caplan recused himself from the CISC's deliberations because of a conflict of
interest or the appearance of one-namely, that Wilson chaired the
department in which Caplan had tenure.81
The CISC also included faculty from around the university, including the
Medical School and the Law School. The CISC ultimately reported to Barry
Cooperman, Penn's Vice Provost for Research, who reported to the provost
and the president at the time, Judith Rodin. The CISC met 4 times in 4
months. At one meeting they grilled Wilson and asked hard questions.82
7 See Memorandum from Denis, supra note 3.
'o See University of Pennsylvania, CISC Procedures (April, 1995), attached to
Memorandum from Neal Nathanson to CISC Members (May 7, 1995) (describing the functions
of the CISC) (on file with author).
81 Memorandum from Dale M. Lombardi, Sec'y, CISC, to Members of CISC (Mar. 28,
1995) (on file with author). After Jesse's death, an external review panel established to
examine Jesse's death, the Danforth Commission, would hone in on the relationship between
Wilson and Caplan as a structure that does not permit the ethicist to give independent advice.
William H. Danforth et al., Report of the Independent Panel Reviewing the University of
Pennsylvania's Institute for Human Gene Therapy, 46 U. PA. ALMANAC, at 4, 4-7 (May 30,
2000), available at http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/v46/n34/IHGT-review.html (last visited
Aug. 7, 2008).
8 Memorandum from Dale Lombardi, Sec'y, CISC, to CISCI Members (Mar. 28, 1995) (on
file with author) (draft minutes of Mar. 13, 1995 meeting).
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Nonetheless, at the end of this long process, the CISC emerged with nearly the
same deal that was proposed at the beginning.
Notwithstanding this, Penn's process was a good one from start to finish.
Penn obtained advice from a top health law firm. The CISC thought long
and hard about the protections for participants. As Figure 11 shows, the CISC
composed a list of issues raised by Wilson's deal in one of its early meetings.
CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
MEMORANDUM
To: CISC MEMBERS
From: Dale M. Lombardi
Date: March 3, 1995
Subject DRAFT MINUTES OF FEBRUARY 6, 1995 MEETING
5. How can Dr. Wilson and the University avoid liability for any damages if a
patient died from any products produced or studied at the University?
15. Once a research course has been chosen, what steps will be taken to assure the
University that the results of studies will not be biased by the financial interests
of Dr. Wilson or his staff?
16. Since Dr. Wilson's research efforts will be directed towards the solution of a
problem in which he has a financial interest in the outcome, how can Dr.
Wilson assure the University that he will not be conflicted when maling
decisions that could have an impact on either Genovo, Biogen or the further
development of his intellectual property?
Figure 11"
Question 5 is especially prescient. It asked how Wilson and the University
could avoid liability for any damages if a participant died in a trial. Ironically,
this question gets dropped from the final minutes of that meeting.8 5
Questions 15 and 16 also zero in on the impact of Wilson's stake for the
university and others, asking in particular about concrete steps to ensure that
funded studies are not biased by Wilson's interests.
In the March 13 meeting at which Wilson appeared, one CISC member,
Dr. Jim Eberwine, asked the $64,000 question. As Figure 12 shows, he asked
Wilson whether Wilson will be involved "in the evaluation of clinical data" in
8 See Memorandum from Denis, supra note 3.
8 Memorandum from Dale Lombardi, Sec'y, CISC, to CISC Members (Mar. 3, 1995) (on
file with author) (draft minutes of Feb. 6, 1995 meeting).
8 Memorandum from Dale Lombardi, Sec'y, CISC, to CISC Members (Mar. 20, 1995) (on
file with author) (final minutes of Feb. 6, 1995 meeting).
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funded trials. Wilson responded that he "will not be involved in the design or
evaluation of the clinical trials."86
Dr. Eberwine raised the issue of Dr. Wilson's involvement in the evaluation of clinical
data developed from patient trials. Dr. Wilson answered that he will not be involved in
the design or evaluation of the clinical trials. However, he reserved the right to be an
author for any manuscripts that evolve out of any trials.
Figure 127
Far from a firewall like that contemplated by Dr. Eberwine and the CISC,
Part V shows that Wilson was hip deep in decisions affecting Jesse's trial.
Indeed, Wilson places himself in the room when the researchers made key
decisions throughout Jesse's trial, such as what disclosures to make in the
Consent Form Jesse signed.
Ultimately, the CISC determined that it will need "unusual circumstances"
in order to meet outside counsel's recommendations for approving a financial
conflict of interest on this scale. CISC member and law professor Seth
Kreimer drafted a memorandum with a number of proposed findings.8 9 The
findings that might support unusual circumstances included the possible
benefit of Wilson's research to the public, the possibility for opening a wide
range of research at Penn, the need to get a timely start on research in a
rapidly changing scientific environment, the fact that nascent technologies
developed by Wilson were already under license to Genovo and that Wilson's
involvement was important for the new research's likely success, together with
the likely lack of available funding from other sources, like NIH. 90 Kreimer
ended the list with what he saw as the crucial question, reproduced in Figure
13 - namely, whether the draft findings warranted approval of Wilson's deal.
8 Memorandum from Lombardi to CISC Members, supra note 82.
87 Id.
" Memorandum from Seth Kreimer, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa., to Dale Lombardi, Sec'y,
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To: Dale Lombardi (FAX 898-9519)
From: Seth Kreimer DRAFT
Re: CISC
Date: May 18, 1995
The residual question for the Committee is, whether these findings are unusualdj enough to suggest that tc is necessary for Dr. Wilson to get a large equiry
position and that Genovo be the corporate sponsor of the research
Figure last
The margin comments made in Figure 13 come from an ex-officio
member Carol Grande, who represented Penn's Center for Venture and
Industry Relationships. She suggested that the minutes drop Kreimer's
residual question.92
Whether the CISC agreed on Kreimer's proposed findings became hotly
disputed, as the letter from another member, Professor Louis Girifalco, drives
home.93 Reproduced in Figure 14, Girifalco's letter relayed his concern that
the CISC never agreed on unusual circumstances findings, yet alone voted to
accept those findings. For him, the factors surrounding the Genovo case were
not "very different from those involved in very many, if not all, high quality
research programs," a view he believed others shared.94 Because the findings
were "not in accord with what transpired," he asked that the minutes be
corrected.95
I amsomewhactucsmd by thedraft minu fC38C for Mtay19S 1995 ad lo IS, 1995
they aso lampedicularyceaeudatatrfecesto 'uusiuacmtances*In
Moen rain
cira=***- nd ltbths dstinbloo was apidtohabov rjcID 1fact, th hidfy 18
mhin uaaotbhoonnincreoc p a slapof *Um~bbloitaggattace foritiBCAM.
W Id.
m Fax from Carol Grande, Dir., Ctr. for Venture & Indus. Relationships, to Dale
Lombardi, Sec'y, CISC (June 8, 1995) (attached to the Kreimer Memo, supra note 88) (on file
with author).
d Fax from Louis Girifalco to Dr. Barry Cooperman, Vice Provost, Research (July 12,
1995) (on file with author).
994
* Id.
reeac Id. as"avewh eivdohessae eauetefnig
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5mu= knina~cc.'WjdtnY wo ~ "tit ora~l fsdto ausestaOW&
Thomut edo mpaqadq yndleathenonmememaemforthnmmntlhshedwith
smpecue the meangof'uual tutns Iweattoowupa saysloitthi ew
aohintgishediacssonafth om asnledmtotmilvothatlbctqninaolvedinthe
swva cae wue very difaottfom toinvod Invery anny, KInoallbgh qutysarch
pa 6gm. I bcefom ha wae aber omiC mine tha leMud my view.
Figure 1409
When Girifalco's concerns were not addressed, he resigned.9 7 As Figure
15 shows, he reiterated his concern that the notion that "the Committee voted
to accept findings of 'unusual circumstances'.. . was an error."9 8
If you will examine the Comunittee minutes, you will note that they state that the Committee
voted to accept findings of "unusual circumstances" with respect to the proposed Genova
arrangements. This was an enor. The Committee did not vote on this. I wrote a letter to the
Chairman and the Secretary of the Committee requesting that the minutes be corrected.
The minutes were not corrected; instead my letter was simply attached to the minutes. This
can give the appearance that I was merely expressing aminority view that is open to interpretation and
notthatthe minutes were in error.
Figure 159
Throughout the process of clearing Wilson's financial stake in Genovo,
concerns like Girifalco's continued to crop up. At the eleventh hour, Associate
General Counsel Robert Terrell annotated the final report delivered to Vice
Provost Cooperman.10 Terrell observed in his own handwriting:
Because the potential conflicts stem largely from Dr. Wilson's equity
holdings in Genovo, it seems to me that what needs to be explained is not the
benefits to the University from the SRA, since presumably University interests
are advanced by most SRAs, but what University interests are advanced by
allowing Dr. Wilson to participate as proposed, i.e. a substantial equity holder
in a sponsor that may benefit from the results of the research. I'm not sure
the proposed findings really address this issue. Is the deal only possible if Dr.
Wilson holds a substantial equity position in Genovo? Why?' 0'
Terrell was not alone in having lingering concerns. Paul Soven, a CISC
member, also found the draft "unusual circumstances" not compelling. 102 He
said "it's a good try but Kreimer's residual question is very cogent. Is it
6 Id.
97 Fax from Louis Girifalco to Dr. Barry Cooperman, Vice Provost, Research (July 18,
1995) (on file with author).
98 Id.
9 Id.
100 Comments on draft CISC recommendations from Robert Terrell, Assoc. Gen. Counsel,
Univ. of Pa., to Barry Cooperman, Vice Provost for Research (Apr. 5, 1995) (on file with
author).
101 Id. at 2-3.
102 Fax from Paul Soven, Member, CISC, to Dale Lombardi, Sec'y, CISC (May 31, 1995)
(on file with author).
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possible that Biogen simply will not come in unless Wilson has a very strong
stake in the matter?"103
Others questioned what "unusual circumstances" even meant as to
Wilson's deal. In a fax dated June 20, 1995, Chair Neal Nathanson told Vice
Provost Barry Cooperman that "[t]he term 'unusual circumstances' appears to
mean different things to different members of the committee, and I have the
impression that these differences will remain an area of ambiguity. It's a bit
like the way the supreme court has chosen to interpret a key phrase in the
constitution differently in different eras, depending on who was writing the
opinion., 0 4 Nathanson questioned not only the ill-defined justification, but
the deal's wisdom: "[S]ome members of the CISC clearly have doubts whether
the terms which were negotiated between the School of Medicine and Genovo
were the best terms which the institution could obtain or even whether they
were acceptable terms. Particular concern was expressed . . . whether the
institution should have insisted that the sponsored research agreement be
made between Biogen and Dr. Wilson rather than Genovo and Dr. Wilson."os
Despite a stream of advice that Penn could simply bypass Wilson's
conflict, Penn chose not to. It approved Wilson's stake on June 25, 1995,
subject to Wilson's acceptance of 16 conditions. 0 6  The bulk of these
restrictions policed the relationship between Wilson and Genovo, forbidding
him to serve in a management role or on the Scientific Advisory Board for
Genovo or Biogen, capping his equity holdings in Genovo at 30%, limiting his
consulting (for all organizations, including Genovo) to "one day in seven," and
prohibiting him from receiving compensation when consulting with Genovo
or Biogen.1o? The letter agreement also required Wilson to disclose his
financial interests in "publications and public presentations" and to all
"current" and "prospective" members of Wilson's lab, to be available "to
discuss with members of your laboratory any concerns or questions ...
regarding Genovo-sponsored research," and to provide information annually
to lab members about an oversight committee that Penn established. 08 As to
the conduct of research trials funded by Genovo, the letter agreement directed
Wilson to:
Avoid direct participation in the conduct of clinical studies in
which Genovo or Biogen has an interest. You are allowed to
participate in the design of such studies but shall not be
responsible for the analysis of data resulting from such studies.109
103 Id.
'" Fax from Neal Nathanson, Chair, CISC to Barry S. Cooperman, Vice Provost for
Research, CISC (June 20, 1995) (on file with author).
105 Id.
106 Letter from Cooperman to Wilson, supra note 74.
107 Id.
108 Id. Two provisions reiterated existing Penn policies: that human research be approved
by Penn's IRB and that animal research be approved by the relevant oversight body. Id. Two
other provisions required Wilson to forego the "inventor's share of equity" and "inventor's
share of royalties" that Wilson would otherwise have received. Id.
109 Id.
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Thus, the letter agreement between Wilson and Penn created a firewall
between Wilson and the management of Genovo but a flimsy barrier between
Wilson and the management of trials like Jesse's.
Of course, the mere possibility of Wilson's participation in key decisions
in Jesse's trial does not mean that he participated nor does it mean that the
possibility of significant financial gain precipitated any particular act or
mistake. The next Part examines Wilson's role in crucial decisions made
during Jesse's clinical trial.
V. WILSON'S ROLE IN JESSE'S CLINICAL TRIAL
One overarching question about how to regulate financial conflicts of
interests going forward is whether the money matters at all. Wilson's own
admissions in his Lessons Learned article provide the best evidence for what
he actually did in Jesse's trial and for what he might have done had no money
been at stake. In that article, Wilson acknowledged that he founded "a
biotechnology company focused on gene therapy while being directly involved
in gene-therapy clinical trials as a sponsor of the respective [Investigational
New Drug]."110  Not only did the "juxtaposition of these two facts,
independent of their connection, raise[] the perception of a potential
financial conflict," n1 but "any clinical success would likely bolster investor
support for the commercial developments of gene therapy that could enhance
the value of most existing gene-therapy companies, including Genovo."112
Thus, as Wilson acknowledges now, Genovo's success might well have lined
Wilson's pockets.
Still, to make the claim that the possibility of financial gain mattered in
Jesse's trial, one would have to believe that Wilson would have made different
choices, with different outcomes, had Wilson not had the possibility of
financial reward. A 2006 book on medical research, What the Doctor Didn't
Say: The Hidden Truth About Medical Research, observed:
There is little reason to think that [Wilson's] financial interests had
anything to do with the specific "wrong things" that were considered to have
taken place in [Jesse's] study. For example, some of the steps taken in
enrolling Jesse in the study appeared to violate procedures required by the
protocol. But there's no specific evidence linking these decisions to Dr.
Wilson. More likely they were made by more junior members of the research
team ... .n
In the weeks after Jesse's death, the idea of distance between Wilson and
Jesse's trial itself seemed a good one. As a sponsor, Wilson would have sat
high above the clinical fray. The Washington Post reported that, according to
insiders, Wilson "went to great pains to ensure that his business interests
no Wilson, supra note 9, at 155.




113 JERRY MENIKOFF & EDWARD P. RICHARDS, WHAT THE DOCTOR DIDN'T SAY: THE
HIDDEN TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL RESEARCH 226-27 (2006).
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would not influence his judgment during [Jesse's trial]. . . . [H]e gave Raper
control over medical and patient care decisions."
But Wilson's own account of how the researchers ran Jesse's trial
disproves any notion of Wilson's isolation from the trial's conduct. According
to Wilson, responsibilities for Jesse's trial "were distributed amongst the three
physician-scientists . . . . Decisions were made in the context of 'team
meetings' with all constituencies present."115 Wilson lauded the value of such
a collaborative approach, arguing it "provided transparency for key decisions
and invited input from all members of the group,"116 including him.
Among other key decisions, Wilson participated in honing the content of
the Consent Form, which, like other decisions, was hashed out in a team
meeting." 7 Specifically,
The OTCD team did discuss the implications of the additional primate
data on the ongoing OTCD study and concluded that these additional studies
did not provide additional new information beyond what was initially
submitted to the RAC and FDA and did not require immediate reporting in
the context of the additional primate data on the ongoing OTCD study.18
In light of the stark changes to the Consent Form's discussion of earlier
animal deaths, outlined in Part II above, this is a significant admission.
Someone, at some point, removed the bald acknowledgement-approved by
the IRB and the RAC-that animals had died in prior trials and substituted
instead the carefully worded, but potentially misleading, disclosure made to
Jesse and Paul.119 Someone somewhere decided to change the Consent Form
without, according to the IRB and the RAC after Jesse's death, sharing that
fact with the regulators charged with policing the consent process. 20 By his
own account, Wilson was intimately familiar with the Consent Form and with
the content of the disclosure to the RAC and presumably the IRB' 2 1 and
helped to make the call about what to tell participants like Jesse.
Still, there is every reason to believe that the outcome of Jesse's trial ould
have been the same even if Wilson had had no monetary interest at stake. In
his Lessons Learned, Wilson notes that in the "competitive profession" of
"academic medicine . . . the primary measure of success [is] recognition by
your colleagues of your research accomplishments.' 22 Such recognition "is
critical to sustaining one's research agenda through the successful
competition for grants and the awarding of academic promotions and
tenure." 23
" Nelson & Weiss, supra note 17.




* Nelson & Weiss, supra note 30, at 1, 2 ("The original consent form reviewed by the
RAC disclosed that monkeys died after receiving a high dose of a similar genetically-altered
virus carrying the OTC gene. Yet the monkey deaths had disappeared from the consent form
that Jesse received, which we got from Penn after obtaining Jesse's father's permission.").
120 See Nelson & Weiss, supra note 17.
121 See supra footnote 52 and accompanying text.
1
2 2 Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 155.
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Since Jesse's death, Wilson has maintained consistently that money does
not motivate researchers like him. As he told The Washington Post two
months after Jesse's death, "To suggest that I acted or was influenced by
money is really offensive to me. I don't think about how my doing this work is
going to make me rich. It's about leadership and notoriety and
accomplishment. Publishing in first-rate journals. That's what turns us on.
You've got to be on the cutting edge and take risks if you're going to stay on
top."124  Wilson's own ego and professional pride, his lust for academic
recognition and advancement, all suggest that the drivers for him went far
beyond his shares in Genovo.12 5
As the next Part explains, Wilson's ambition and complex motivation
provides a useful test of the two dominant narratives about financial conflicts
- namely, that the best way to manage financial conflicts is to bar them
entirely and the contrary view that we would be foolish to eliminate such ties.
VI. COMPETING NARRATIVES ABOUT FINANCIAL TIES
The debate about financial conflicts of interest in human subjects
research has been dominated by two competing narratives-that researchers'
financial ties 26 advance science by drawing new streams of money in an era of
shrinking public support for human subjects research, and the competing idea
that financial ties exert a "corrosive effect" on researchers' judgments. 27 As
the most famous financial conflict of interest case in recent memory, Jesse's
trial provides an important lens for evaluating these conflicting visions about
the role of money in research. This Part concludes that neither narrative
accurately captures the complexity of the researchers' interests and
motivations during Jesse's trial, or the complexity of the financial deal itself.
123 Id.
124 Nelson & Weiss, supra note 17.
12 Just as the fact of a conflict does not prove an impact on judgment, neither does the
fact of participation by Wilson tell us whether better or different rules would have made a
difference in Jesse's trial. This kind of proof will likely never be present when a trial ends
badly, unless the conflicted researcher issues a mea culpa.
i' Institutional conflicts of interest have also come under fire. Universities as a group are
the single largest patent holder in the world, and make money as a result of translating
research of individual faculty into the marketplace. Presumably, if the adenovirus developed
by Wilson performed well, Penn would have gained directly, either by licensing the virus or as
a result of its equity interest in the licensing body, here Genovo. Thus, while the institutional
conflict of interest would likely have been present in any arrangement that Penn authorized,
the individual conflict of interest would not have been nearly as pronounced if Penn had
required Wilson to divest his shares in Genovo. Cf supra Part IV (discussing financial
conflicts of interest).
127 Concerns for patient trust comprise a third narrative. See, e.g., Kevin P. Weinfurt et al.,
Effects of Disclosing Financial Interests on Attitudes Toward Clinical Research, 23 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 862, 864 (2008) (finding in a survey of adults suffering from diabetes or
asthma that disclosures of financial conflicts "were associated with some respondents trusting
the researchers less, although trust among some respondents increased," and observing that
the "findings regarding trust area important given how central trust can be to participation in
research and to public acceptance of research findings, and considering the need to ensure
that the clinical research enterprise merits the trust that participants confer on it.").
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A. INDUSTRY FUNDING Is ESSENTIAL?
Consider first the pro-industry-funding position. The American Council
on Science and Health ("ACSH") issued a position paper in 2008 signed by a
prestigious group of members, which included Arthur Caplan. In it, ACSH
sees "very real harm that can result from limiting industry/university
collaborations." 2 s It maintains that "the collaboration between science and
industry has been threatened by the development of a movement that
proposes to end or drastically limit such cooperation on the grounds that it
involves unacceptable conflicts of interest."2 9
In ACSH's view, bans go too far because two "mechanisms currently in
place to protect the integrity of scientific research," peer review and
disclosure, suffice to prevent abuses.130 For example, before a paper is
published in a scientific journal, the findings are reviewed anonymously by
other experts.'' This "ensures that all research published in peer-reviewed
journals has undergone systematic scrutiny before publication," exposing
flaws in the research design "attributable to a wide variety of causes, not just
those linked to conflicts of interest.12 These journals also "require the authors
of submitted papers to disclose any financial interests relevant to the work
being submitted, as well as the source of funding for the research."'33 Such
disclosure rules, the ACSH maintains, are better than "prohibiting those with
potential conflicts of interest from engaging in certain types of professional
activity.""'
At least in Jesse's trial, ACSH's confidence in these mechanisms as checks
on the potential for abuse seems misplaced. Wilson published papers about
the trial both before Jesse's death and after. One paper published after Jesse's
death discloses Wilson's conflict in an acknowledgment after the body of the
paper in this way: "Dr. Wilson previously received support from Genovo, Inc.,
a company in which he holds equity."'35 This disclosure does not alert the
reader to the nature or degree of Wilson's financial interest in Genovo or to
Wilson's role in the conduct of the published study and says nothing about
any opportunities for bias or an impact on Wilson's judgment. Like this
unadorned statement, the disclosure made to Jesse in the Consent Form,
which arguably represented the state of the art at the time, blandly references
1
28 AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, COLLABORATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND
INDUSTRY: PRO'S AND CON'S OF THE CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST MOVEMENT 4 (2008).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 9.
1'3 Id.
132 Id. at 10.
"' Id. at 11. The report also criticizes the "conflicts-of-interest movement" for focusing
solely on "financial conflicts of interest." Id. It recognizes the complexity of human
motivation, discussing factors as varied as political views, age, and sexual orientation, and
concludes that "money is not the only basis for a conflict of interest." Id.
134 Id.
131 Steven E. Raper et al., Fatal Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome in a Orithine
Transcarbamylase Deficient Patient Following Adenoviral Gene Transfer, 80 MOLECULAR
GENETICS & METABOLISM 148, 157 (2003); see also Steven R. Raper et al., A Pilot Study ofIn
Vivo Liver-Directed Gene Transfer with an Adenoviral Vector in Partial Ornithine
Transcarbamylase Deficiency, 13 HUM. GENE THERAPY 163, 174 (2002).
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"a financial interest in a successful outcome. Like the author disclosure, a
"financial interest" could encompass a $1,000 payment for each subject
enrolled, as occurs with many trials sponsored by pharmaceutical
companies,"' or it might encompass the tens of millions of dollars that Penn
implicitly contemplated Wilson holding in its December 15, 1994, memo.13s
Empirical studies of disclosure show that most readers see these financial
tethers as very different conflicts. 139 But each kind of conflict would result in
the same one-sentence disclosure without more. Because negligible ties
trigger the same disclosure as the possibility of millions, it seems unlikely that
mere disclosure can serve as a meaningful check on conduct in the funded
trial.
Neither does a one-sentence disclosure alert participants or peer
reviewers to the ground rules imposed by the institution on the researcher's
participation or to whether the researcher complied with those ground rules.
The possibility of clouded judgment stems not only from a researcher's
financial interest, but from the researcher's precise role in the trial. CISC
member Jim Eberwine contemplated a firewall between Wilson and any
decisions made in the trial, a constraint that Penn significantly relaxed when
it instructed Wilson to "[a]void direct participation in the conduct of clinical
studies in which Genovo or Biogen has an interest.""'o
Wilson acknowledges in his Lessons Learned that he shared significant
"responsibilities for the protocol"-decisions that have a direct bearing on
what happened to participants in the trial. For example, a key requirement
for enrolling subjects in the trial involved "a measurement of serum
ammonia.""' In the course of multiple revisions to the protocol, this
"threshold had been increased from 50 to 70 1iM."
142  Had the firewall
envisioned by Eberwine been in place, Wilson would have played no role in
the decision to change this critical indice in the protocol. By contrast, it
appears that Penn's letter agreement with Wilson allowed precisely this type
of participation by him in key decisions that a reasonable person would
foresee impacting real people.
On a deeper level, ACSH's core claim that financial conflicts should be
overlooked because of the need to draw money to research is flawed as to
Jesse's case. Person after person inside Penn charged with evaluating
Wilson's hefty stake recognized that Wilson's deal may not have been
necessary to securing the sponsored research agreement.143 As they pointed
out, Penn could simply have run the SRA from Biogen to Penn, bypassing
136 Consent Form, supra note 9, at 11.
137 Weinfurt et al., supra note 127, at 861.
13 See Memorandum from Denis, supra note 3.
139 When asked, potential research subjects view equity ownership as much more
problematic than receiving per capita payments or other financial conflicts. Weinfurt et al.,
supra note 127, at 863; Lindsay A. Hampson et al., Patients' Views on Financial Conflicts of
Interest in Cancer Research Trials, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2330, 2336 (2006).
1I Letter from Cooperman to Wilson, supra note 74.
141 Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 154.
142 Id.
141 See supra Part V (discussing comments by the Associate General Counsel Robert
Terrell and the Conflict of Interest Standing Committee chair Neal Nathanson, among others).
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Genovo and Wilson's conflict entirely. 1" If Penn had structured the SRA
between Biogen and Penn, Wilson presumably still would have participated in
funded research but would not have had an equity interest in the outcome. If
Penn had taken this approach, it still would have had entered into a SRA and
received all the biotech dollars that flow from that-demonstrating that
funding and conflicts need not always go hand-in-hand. Indeed, Jesse's trial
exposes this "trade-off"as a false choice.
B. CONFLICTS CORRUPT JUDGMENT?
Anchoring the other end of the spectrum from ACSH is the 2009 IOM
report on conflicts of interest. In it, the IOM states that "individuals generally
[should] not conduct research with human participants if they have a
significant financial interest in an existing or potential product or a company
that could be affected by the outcome of the research.""' They justify this
preclusion as necessary to "prevent undue influence or erosion of confidence
in the research enterprise."14 6 The IOM receives considerable support for this
position from study participants themselves. For instance, when a financial
conflict of interest is present, study participants worry about "'data integrity'
and 'conflicts of interest' as well as "'money's potential corrupting
influence.""47
As hawkish as the IOM is about financial conflicts, it would nonetheless
make some limited allowance for clinical investigators to hold equity interests.
This would occur only when the clinical investigator's "participation is
determined-after careful assessment-to be necessary for the safety,
reliability, or validity of the research.""' Even then, the IOM would require a
conflict of interest committee to create a management plan, which could
"restrict the researcher [from] recruiting subjects; obtaining informed
consent; assessing clinical endpoints; analyzing data; or writing the results,




145 INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND
PRACTICE 117-18 (Bernard M. Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009) ("This recommendation covers
principal investigators and others who share substantial responsibility for the design, conduct,
or reporting of the findings of clinical studies.").
146 Id. at 117.
147 Jesse A. Goldner, Childress Lecture: Regulating Conflicts ofInterest in Research: The
Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1211, 1223 (2009) (citing Christine Grady et
al., The Limits of Disclosure: What Research Subjects Want to Know About Investigator
Financial Interests, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 595 (2006)).
1' INST. OF MED., supra note 145, at 118.
148 Id. at 118-19. Like the IOM, the Association of American Medical Colleges and the
Association of American University in a joint report in 2008 recommended that institutions
carefully define "compelling circumstances" under which conflicted investigators may
participate in research. AAMC-AAU ADVISORY COMM. ON FIN. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, PROTECTING PATIENTS, PRESERVING INTEGRITY, ADVANCING
HEALTH: ACCELERATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COI POLICIES IN HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH 6-7 (2008). As the joint report explains, "[w]hether the circumstances are deemed
compelling will depend in each case upon the nature of the science, the nature of the interest,
how closely the interest is related to the research, and the degree to which the interest may be
affected by the research." Id. at 6.
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Seton Hall University's Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law &
Policy's 2009 White Paper on conflicts of interest also strongly recommends
that conflicts be generally banned. It stresses the need for financial neutrality
in clinical trials, especially where physicians and investigators are
concerned.'s This financial neutrality should be achieved primarily through
regulation, since prosecutors generally focus on outlier cases."' The White
Paper reviewed common forms of compensation, including when a researcher
holds equity in a sponsor, which would give investigators a financial stake in
the outcome of the trial.152 Such interests should be "prohibit[ed] [as a] form
of payment to physicians and other researchers, those in positions to affect the
conduct of the research, or to entities conducting the research.""' But the
White Paper would allow equity holdings by investigators or direct family if
the "research could not be conducted effectively or safely without the
individual's participation."5 ' In such a "compelling" instance, the
investigators role would be limited to that of a consultant, not investigator,
with no connection to recruitment, enrollment, or informed consent."'
By these restrictive yardsticks, Penn's management of Wilson's conflict
stacks up pretty well. Penn told Wilson that "[y]ou are allowed to participate
in the design of such studies but shall not be responsible for the analysis of
data resulting from such studies.""' It established an Oversight Committee to
which Wilson had to provide information annually. Penn "tried to manage
[concerns about Wilson's role] by precluding [him] from interacting with the
subjects or participating in their management, based on the concern that [he]
discovered some of the technology and therefore was invested in its success.""'
Thus, under both the IOM approach and Seton Hall's White Paper approach,
Wilson's deal likely would have gone forward. Query whether Wilson would
have violated the IOM or White Paper restrictions by revising the trial's
protocol or the content of the Consent Form, as long as he did not directly
contact a subject or otherwise participate in the management of subjects. Put
another way, recommendations to sharply curb financial conflicts likely will
not operate on the ground to bar many proposed deals, even those with
gargantuan stakes like the ones held by Wilson.
150 Kathleen M. Boozang et al., THE CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAw & PoIcY, SETON
HALL LAw SCH., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL TRIAL RECRUITMENT AND
ENROLLMENT: A CALL FOR INCREASED OVERSIGHT 1 (2009) [hereinafter "WHITE PAPER"].
15 Id.
152 Id. at 28.
15 Id.
" Id. at 29. This is consistent with the approach taken by most research universities,
81% of which allow researchers with "significant financial interests" to participate in human
research in compelling circumstances. See SUSAN EHRINGHAUS & DAVID KORN, U.S. MEDICAL
SCHOOL POLICIES ON INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: RESULTS OF AN AAMC
SURVEY, Ass'N OF Am. MED. C. 4 (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.aamc.org/research/coi/coiresults2003.pdf.
151 WHITE PAPER, supra note 150, at 29.
1' Letter from Cooperman to Wilson, supra note 74.
'
1 7 Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 156.
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VII. AGGRESSIVE MONITORING AS THE WAY FORWARD
A number of research institutions over the last decade have instituted a
new regulatory regime that works in conjunction with the IRB process: post-
approval monitoring.' The goals of post-approval monitoring are
straightforward, to "ensure the rights and well-being of research subjects," as
well as "ensur[ing] compliance with federal, state, local, and institutional ...
guidelines."5 9 Rather than seeking to expunge financial ties or police them
through disclosure and publication rules, one promising approach may be to
marry the IRB and conflict of interest approval processes with medicine's
invigorated culture of regulatory compliance. Under this scheme, any
significant financial interest would trigger mandatory, periodic, unannounced
audits of the trial's conduct.'6o
Theoretically, all human trials have been subject to ongoing review by the
IRB since the creation of IRBs. In practice, however, the trials watched most
closely by institutions that have existing programs for post-approval
monitoring tend to be studies that pose moderate to high risk to subjects,
investigator-initiated studies, and, most relevant here, studies with possible
conflicts of interest.'' In the post-approval monitoring process, if a study is
selected for review, the monitor notifies the principal investigator and reviews
the trial's records. That review may cover any communication with the IRB
and other oversight committees, contact with federal regulatory authorities,
consent forms and the consent process for individual subjects, whether
protocols were adhered to or changed, and whether there were serious adverse
events.6 2
While Jesse's trial may well have been randomly selected for review at
institutions that now conduct post-approval monitoring, it would have been
"s Institutions with post-approval monitoring programs include the University of
Virginia, http://www.virginia.edu/vpr/pam/index.html; University of Cincinnati,
http://researchcompliance.uc.edu/PAM/Default.html; University of California-Davis,
http://safetyservices.ucdavis.edu/iacuc/policies/post-approval-monitoring-program; Georgia
State University, http://www.gsu.edu/research/22242.html; East Tennessee State University,
http://www.etsu.edu/ucac/monitoring.aspx; and University of Mississippi,
https://secure4.olemiss.edu/umpolicyopen ((follow "Table of Contents" hyperlink; then follow
"RSP Research and Sponsored Programs" hyperlink; then follow "RI Research Integrity"
hyperlink; then follow "301 Institutional Review Board" hyperlink; then follow
"RSP.RI.301.020 IRB Post Approval Monitoring Program hyperlink) (all last visited April 26,
2010).
159 Post Approval Monitoring, University of Virginia, available at
http://www.virginia.edu/vpr/pam/index.html (last visited April 26, 2010).
1so Professor Jesse Goldner has also urged institutional reforms to conflict of interest
committees, such as regulating membership criteria and mandating inclusion of committee
members with no institutional connections. Goldner, supra note 147, at 1247. Additionally,
"all financial conflicts of interest of any amount" would be disclosed to the conflict of interest
committee as well as on a NIH-sponsored website and in the trial's consent form. Id. at 1248.
Conflict of interest committees should describe conflicts of interest in the same section of the
informed consent document as the "description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or
discomforts to the subject." Id. at 1249-50 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2)).
16' For an example, see The Human Subjects Research Post Approval Monitoring
Program, University of Cincinnati, available at
http://researchcompliance.uc.edu/PAM/Default.html (last visited April 26, 2010).
' For an example, see Post Approval Monitoring FAQ, University of Virginia, available
at http://www.virginia.edu/vpr/pam/faq.html (last visited April 26, 2010).
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purely a matter of chance. Thus, even trials with large financial conflicts of
interest may never be monitored despite the possible risk to subjects. While
the random nature of any monitoring serves to ensure institutional
compliance generally, it would not guarantee that a trial to which a researcher
has a significant financial tie would be selected for monitoring.
A mandatory trigger for post-approval monitoring of any trial marked by
significant financial conflicts of interest would ensure review of the affected
researcher's judgment. 163  In Jesse's case, such a review may have picked up
"real-time" changes to the protocol never approved by the IRB. It almost
certainly would have uncovered changes to the Consent Form that likely
would have discouraged Jesse,164 if not other participants,1 65 from enrolling -
namely, the death of monkeys and mice in earlier trials. Mandatory
monitoring may have also surfaced other errors, like the adverse events
166
experienced by earlier subjects. The only mistake acknowledged by Wilson
that clearly would not have been picked up by mandatory monitoring would
have been the decision to infuse Jesse on the day of the trial because no
mandatory monitoring could feasibly encompass real-time assessment.
In this mandatory scheme, the threshold for a significant financial
interest could be defined institution by institution or by federal regulation. To
avoid over-inclusion, the threshold for mandatory monitoring should
probably exceed the $10,000 threshold that defines a significant financial
interest now under current law. On the equity side, the percentage defined as
a significant financial interest may need to take into account the probable
market value of the shares now and after a public offering.167
In practice, the two institutional entities charged with policing human
research and financial conflicts, the IRB and the institution's conflict
"I Of course, had Wilson been required to divest his shares in Genovo, or if Penn had
chosen to run the SRA between Biogen and Penn, decisions in Jesse's trial may have
nonetheless unfolded precisely as they did. Obviously in the absence of a conflict, the reform
urged here would not have flagged Jesse's trial for special vigilance. Institutions nonetheless
could choose to police the possibility of errors in non-conflicted trials through random post-
approval monitoring or other mechanisms used by the institution to ensure regulatory
compliance.
"6' See supra notes 24-25, 43-47 (discussion between Paul and Jesse about the risk of
death).
1' Weinfurt et al., supra note 127, at 862, 864 (reporting that many subjects would enroll
notwithstanding certain financial ties). In a study of cancer patients receiving experimental
treatment, 80% expressed no concern "that the doctor running their study might have
'financial ties with the company that makes the drug used in the study."' Hampson et al.,
supra note 139, at 2332. "Less than 15% of patients reported that knowledge of a financial tie
would have kept them from participating in the cancer trial." Id. Contrasting that statistic
with the 13 to 34% of patients who felt that financial ties should be barred led the authors to
suspect "that for seriously ill patients, disclosure [of financial ties] is unlikely to provide
protection against the potential harm of financial interests." Id. at 2336. Obviously, the risk-
benefit calculation of patients in need of experimental therapy for an underlying disease may
not predict the assessments that would be made by relatively healthy, functioning participants
like Jesse.
1" Nelson & Weiss, supra note 30, at 2 (showing that four successive volunteers suffered
side effects so serious that Penn should have halted the study and notified the FDA
immediately in every case - but didn't do so for the third or fourth participants).
167 It may be difficult to predict what a market value might be but a probable range could
be provided.
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committee, may have to work together to monitor studies. The IRB will need
to make sure that studies with a potential for high risk to human subjects are
monitored on a regular basis, using financial ties as a trigger. In partnership
with the IRB, the institution's conflict of interest committee may need to flag
certain studies that exceed pre-established financial thresholds for referral to
the IRB. Clearly, these committees would need to coordinate their efforts.
While mandatory monitoring will provide a more effective review process,
there undoubtedly will be a substantial cost attached to this increased
vigilance. These costs should be considered a loading charge" for
undertaking studies with substantial financial conflicts of interest. Indeed,
the cost of monitoring likely will pale in comparison to the financial infusion
provided by the SRA. For example, under the terms of Penn's SRA with
Genovo, Genovo provided $21 million for research over 5 years.' Even if
$100,000 of that sum were allocated to mandatory monitoring, this
represents less than half of 1 percent of the sums garnered by Penn as a result
of Genovo's sponsorship.
Not every financial conflict will be on the scale of Wilson's, and neither
will every sponsored research agreement provide for such a substantial
infusion of funds. Admittedly, an adequate monitoring program that
encompasses smaller but still significant financial ties may be an expensive
endeavor if done right-likely requiring several well-trained and
knowledgeable full-time staff to cover a busy research institution. Yet
institutions like Penn have learned the hard way that review of a research
study prior to its implementation does not fully protect human subjects. Post-
approval monitoring offers a more meaningful way for institutions to assure
that what the investigator says he is going to do is what is actually done.
Spending tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars a year to fund a
robust post-approval monitoring program would seem preferable not only to
the tragic death of a 19-year-old, but also to the horrendous publicity,
expense, and time spent managing the aftermath of profound, yet often
preventable, errors in human trials.
Some may see such monitoring as yet another example of paper
compliance, with its increasing cost for human subjects research. The cost of
monitoring should be the entry fee for engaging in trials with substantial
financial ties. Investigators and researchers should not be permitted to
explain after a participant's death, as Wilson did in the Lessons Learned, that
It is clear now that the Clinical and Quality Assurance (QA) groups did
not have the resources necessary to assure complete compliance for such a
dynamic and complex protocol. They were asked to cover too much territory:
each clinical research nurse oversaw as many as three gene-therapy protocols
at any one time, while the QA group, which numbered seven staff members at
its peak, was responsible for most aspects of GMP, GCP, and GLP compliance
for up to seven active INDs. Support for these programs was provided
primarily from grants and contracts that, individually, did not provide
sufficient Clinical and QA resources to fully support specific protocols. 69
' Nelson & Weiss, supra note 17.
'9 Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 154.
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As Wilson himself acknowledges, the three investigators in Jesse's trial
had pre-existing duties to ensure participant safety separate and apart from
efforts to "manage" Wilson's financial conflict. Mandatory post-approval
monitoring would make routine the oversight already required by federal
regulators, and prevent trials from being undertaken in the haphazard way
that marked Jesse's clinical trial.
A more sophisticated critique may say that the whole enterprise of post-
approval monitoring is subject to hindsight bias as a result of which, in
retrospect and upon further analysis, "[p]ast events seem more predictable
than they really were."170 This bias has been shown in studies of college
undergraduates, experts in varied fields, and "even state and federal judges." 7n
Like most disasters, Jesse's death was preceded by a number of mistakes.
While it is true that hindsight is 20/20, and that we often realize that
mistakes were important only after an event, in Jesse's case the mistakes
preceding his death were obvious and blatant. Clear and material departures
from the protocol, which Wilson himself described as a "living document," 172
unapproved changes to the Consent Form, and records showing "four
successive volunteers had suffered side effects so serious that Penn should
have halted the study and notified the federal agency immediately in every
case - but didn't do so for the third or fourth patients,"r' certainly would have
leapt out to any person charged with monitoring the conduct of Jesse's trial-
especially in light of the colossal stakes held by one of the researchers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Jesse's death sparked a re-examination of researchers' financial ties to the
human trials they conduct, an important legacy in itself. Internal Penn
documents priced Wilson's financial stake in Jesse's trial to be in the tens of
millions of dollars-ample motivation for anyone to cut corners or push
research more quickly than it should proceed. Recognizing that potential,
Penn's conflict of interest committee honed in on Wilson's precise role in
funded trials. Yet when Penn as an institution authorized Wilson's hefty
stake, it required that Wilson not "direct[ly] participat[e] in the conduct of
clinical trials," leaving him free to make key design decisions. More
importantly, Penn simply trusted that these ground rules would be followed.
Sadly, the decisions ultimately made in Jesse's trial by Wilson and his
colleagues provide powerful testimony to the need for more vigilence. Unlike
both the movement to ban financial conflicts and the movement to ratify
them, mandatory post-approval monitoring in trials with significant financial
conflicts would allow crucial research to be done without neglecting the risk
to human subjects that often results. Financial triggers for mandatory review
would be a significant step in protecting future human subjects who, like
Jesse Gelsinger, deserve our continued vigilance and commitment.
170 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571, 576 (1998).
'n Id. at 579-80.
172 Lessons Learned, supra note 9, at 155.
'7 Nelson & Weiss, supra note 30, at 3.
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